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1996 SIEBENTHALER LECTURE
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND DEMOCRATIC POLITICS 1

by Kent Greenawalt

I. INTRODUCTION
Some time ago, President Clinton talked to a gathering of religious
journalists about abortion. He said that he did not believe that the biblical
passages often cited by those who are "pro-life" indicate· clearly' that
abortion is wrong and should be prohibited. The reasons many people
have for wanting abortion to be prohibited, or for allowing abortion,
relate to their religious convictions. These people, for the most part,
regard it as perfectly appropriate that religious perspectives help determine public policy on abortion in the United States. Others object. They
say that the religious views of some people should not be imposed on
others. Who is right? Is this a question of simple right or wrong, or are
matters much more complex?
My main subject is the use of religious convictions in the making of
public political decisions. Abortion is the most controversial illustration,
but it by no means stands alone. Welfare provisions, capital punishment,
treatment of animals, environmental protection, military policy, and a
host of other political issues may be tied to religious understandings.
Should these understandings influence public policy?
Let me clarify a crucial point at the outset. None of us can wholly
compartmentalize our convictions. Strong religious convictions will influence political opinions; people cannot help themselves. But that does not
mean people should self-consciously rely on religious convictions to settle
political questions. Perhaps they should develop opinions and formulate
views in some other way. By comparison, if a child grows up feeling

I. This is the text of a Siebenthaler Lecture delivered on February 23, 1996. It
summarizes ideas developed at fuller length in Private Consciences and Public Reasons (New
York, Oxford University Press 1995). That book contains references and more detailed analysis.
Remarks closely similar to those found here were distributed in a pamphlet, called Religious
Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Political Discourse, of the Judaic Studies Program of the
University of Cincinnati.
I am very grateful for the warm hospitality of the faculty and
students during my visit at Salmon P. Chase College of Law.
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strong hostility toward her parents, that also will influence her political
judgment, but she should try to address political issues in other terms.
Should she treat her religious views similarly, or is it all right to rely on
them self-consciously?
If what follows, I draw many distinctions. The most fundamental ones
are between private citizens and public officials and between one's actual
bases for judgment and one's stated reasons. Very briefly, I think private
individuals should regard themselves as free to rely upon and state religious reasons; public officials acting in their official capacity should
rarely state religious reasons as their bases for political decisions, and
they should be more hesitant even to rely on religious reasons than private citizens. The particular restraints vary depending upon the kind of
official.
The restraints I have primarily in mind are definitely not direct legal
restraints; those would themselves be unconstitutional in the main. The
restraints are not even the indirect restraints of invalidating legislation
based on religious grounds. Rather, I am talking about self-restraint,
supported by mutual expectations.
II. THE RELIGION CLAUSES

I want first to say a few words about the free exercise and establishment clauses of our constitution. The First Amendment says, "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the force exercise there of . . . . "
What have these legal constraints to do with my primary topic? Perhaps certain religious grounds for political decisions will actually violate
one of the religion clauses. Even if no violation of constitutional law
occurs, perhaps values that underlie the clauses will tell us something
about appropriate behavior. When people say, for example, that the prolife position on abortion offends separation of church and state, do they
mean that if the position were enacted into law, the establishment clause
would actually be violated, or do they mean only that some spirit of
separation is offended? Do they even know which they mean?
Let us begin with the free exercise clause. Most importantly, people in
the United States are free to believe what they choose, to express their
beliefs, and, with limited exceptions, to worship as they wish. As many
of you know, the last six years has seen a storm of controversy about
standards for free exercise claims. In 1990, the Supreme Court decided
whether members of the Native American Church had a constitutional
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right to use peyote as a sacrament in their worship services. 2 Rejecting
the claim, the court said that if a law has a valid secular purpose, it can
be applied across the board. Those with religious reasons to disobey are
no better off than those disobeying for other reasons.
The decision was attacked by a wide spectrum of religious groups and
by constitutional scholars; and Congress has voted to re-establish the
previous constitutional test, a version of the compelling interest test. 3
What has free exercise to do with the problem of how political.decisions are made? One point is obvious. Many people, including a high
percentage of Christians, Jews, and Muslims, see their religious convictions as having some political implications. One aspect of the full exercise
of their religion is the acting upon these implications. Thus, for someone
who thinks God disapproves homosexual behavior and wants human
societies to restrict this behavior, acting on this belief in the political
sphere is experienced as part of the exercise of religion.
Another point is less obvious. If some people act on their religious
convictions, that may thwart the free exercise of people with other religious convictions. Thus, if enough people vote their religious conviction
that drug use is sinful, that can impair the free exercise of people whose
religion calls for the use of drugs. Here we perceive a crucial difference.
Only some uses of religious convictions genuinely thwart the free exercise of others. Other uses do not. I shall return shortly to this difference.
The establishment clause forbids the government's establishing any
particular religion in the manner in which the Anglican Church is made
the Church of England. Beyond this, it forbids the preferring of some
religions or churches over others. According to modern Supreme Court·
interpretation, government cannot prefer all religions to no religion or
antireligion. This last principle is controversial; many think a general
preference for religion should be permissible. After the last term of the
Supreme Court, establishment clause doctrine is in disarray;4 but it re-

2. Employment Division, Depanment of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872 (1990). In 1986, it had sustained application of the Air Force's rule that personnel must
not wear headgear indoors against an Orthodox Jewish clinical psychologist who wore a yarmulke. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986). To most observers, the government's
interest in forcing Dr. Goldman to remove his yarmulke seemed much less than. compelling;
but the Court emphasized deference to military authorities.
3. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 107 Stat. 1488, codified at 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
4. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 115· S. Ct. 2510
(1995); Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette, 115 S. Ct. 2440 (1995); see
generally Kent Greenawalt, Quo Vadis: The Status and Prospects of "Tests" Under the Religion
Clauses, 1995 SUPREME COURT REVIEW 323.
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mains true that the outright promotion of religion is not permitted.
What are the implications for political decision and discourse of the
establishment clause? Suppose a law was overwhelmingly based on religious grounds and was designed to promote that religious understanding;
and all this was announced in the preamble to the statute. That would be
an establishment of that religious point of view. Some writers have concluded that whenever officials, or citizens, promote particular political
positions because of religious grounds, this involves an actual or potential
breach of the establishment clause. 5 These writers do not suppose that
the courts can correct all these wrongs, but nevertheless the Constitution
has been violated.
A more moderate position is that each reliance on a religious ground
offends some spirit of nonestablishment. On this view, the values underlying the establishment clause press toward nonreligious political judgment and discourse. We can see, then, that the most expansive idea of
free exercise might allow citizens and officials to use religious grounds
whenever they find them to be relevant. The most expansive idea of
nonestablishment might discourage use of religious grounds. How can we
work our way out of this dilemma?

Ill.

RELIGIOUS IMPOSITIONS AND OTHER USES OF RELIGIOUS GROUNDS

The first step is to distinguish between religious impositions and other
uses of religious grounds in political judgment. This is the difference I
mentioned earlier. Suppose that out of Christian convictions, someone
proposes that all nonChristians be taxed, with the benefits going to Christian churches. This step would straightforwardly prefer the Christian
religion; it would discourage the practice of other religions. It would
constitute a religious imposition. Such legislation is at odds with the
religion clauses. When legislators and citizens have a similar motivation
to adopt laws that are not so obviously preferential, they offend at least
the spirit of the religion clauses.
On the other hand, suppose a legislator proposes to restrict factory
farming. She thinks on religious grounds that higher animals deserve
more consideration from human beings than they have received. She does
not wish to promote her religious beliefs or discourage anyone's religious
practice. She wants only to give animals a more decent life. If the legislation is adopted, no one's religious beliefs and practices will be directly

5. See, e.g., Edward 8. Foley, Book Review Essay: Tillich and Camus, Talking Politics,
92 Colum. L. Rev. 854 (1992).
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affected. This use of religious grounds does not involve an imposition.
Here no one's free exercise is affected and no religious views are established.
People often miss this distinction. They may simply assume that any
use of religious grounds involves an imposition. Or they may condemn
use of religious grounds that oppose political positions they favor and
welcome religious grounds that support their own positions. Some of
those who complain about the religious sources of pro-life positions had
no difficulty with religious grounds for civil rights or against capital
punishment. If we are going to come to grips with this subject in a serious way, we must resist the easy conclusion that religion is fine when it
supports our views and illegitimate when it opposes them. The beginning
of wisdom is to recognize that religious impositions and motives to impose are wrong; they are not appropriate in our liberal democracy. It is
other uses of religious grounds that require more careful examination.
I shall use the factory farming example. It is less controversial than
abortion, but troubling enough to draw our attention. Most animals that
we eat for meat live pretty awful lives, caged without the ability to move;
· but should we care very much about this? Do pigs and chickens count for
a great deal or should we regard their lives as essentially for our own
purposes? Some people inform themselves on this subject without respect
to religious convictions. Others draw from religious beliefs. That does
not mean any neat connection exists between most religions and any
particular positions. Some Christians, for example, believe that the Bible
establishes that animals are for human dominion; if so, we don't have to
worry about factory farming, except for assuring the health of human
beings. Other Christians think that we are called to care seriously for all
creatures. From this perspective, aspects of factory farming are much
more disturbing. Maybe a higher price for meat would be worth paying
in order to give the animals we kill more freedom to move about and
engage with other animals. When they face this issue, is it all right for
citizens and legislators to make up their minds on religious grounds and
to defend their choices in these terms, or should people try to rely on
nonreligious bases of decision?
IV. SOME BASIC POSITIONS AND PERSPECTIVES OF JUDGMENT

Political philosophers disagree. Here, in a nutshell, are some of the
major positions. Some say that people and officials are completely free to
rely on whatever grounds seem compelling to them. An opposing position
is that people in a liberal democracy should make decisions on bases that
are widely shared and accessible to all citizens. At least at this point in
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history, the ideas that the government should show equal concern for
citizens and not discriminate against people because they belong to an
inferior race are fundamental tenets of all liberal democracies. These
ideas would be good starting points for political decisions. The notion
that Genesis establishes that animals are subject to dominion for human
use would not. A somewhat different position claims that religious
grounds in particular are improper bases for political positions because of
the establishment clause and the fundamental idea of religious plurality.
Then there are various intermediate positions. One is that everything
depends on the kind of religious understanding involved. Views that are
not too dogmatic and sectarian, that are open to competing points of
view, play a useful role in politics. Views that are narrow and dogmatic,
that leave nothing for dialogue with others, do not belong in the politics
of a liberal democracy. A different intermediate position distinguishes
ordinary political issues from constitutional issues and issues of basic
justice. 6 For ordinary issues, religious grounds are appropriate; but for
constitutional issues people should rely on reasons that would have persuasive force for all reasonable citizens.
How can we judge between the positions that are offered? The two
crucial variables are fairness and the health of our political life. The
fairness argument against using religious grounds is that it is unfair to
adopt coercive legislation on bases that one cannot expect a significant
portion of the population to accept. Thus, it would be unfair to restrict
factory farming, because some people make religious judgments that
many farmers and consumers reasonably do not accept. The fairness
argument on the other side is that it is not fair to prevent people from
relying on grounds that they find most convincing.
When one turns to the quality of political life, one may worry that
large injections of religion will cause conflict and dissension, and feelings
of exclusion. Certainly the wars at the time of the Reformation show that
religion can be a terribly divisive force, and the modern world is far
from free of violence related to religion. On the other hand, our society
is a lot different from Europe in the 16th and 17th centuries. An open
airing of religious positions may enhance understanding of political possibilities and of the relevance of religion for society. These various arguments stand in powerful opposition; choosing between them is not easy.
When we look more closely, we see that the strength of these arguments

6. This is the position of John Rawls, most fully developed in Political Liberalism (New
York. Columbia University Press 1993).
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varies depending on the persons and behavior on which one focuses. It is
this truth that underlies my position.

V.

HISTORY, CULTURE, PRACTICES, AND EXPECTATIONS

I am going to discuss judges, legislators, ordinary citizens, and religious groups. I should say at the outset that I do not think basic premises
of liberal democracy settle exactly how far religious convictions should
count in political life. Much depends on the history and cultural life of
particular societies.
The relevance of history and culture is most apparent if one asks
whether people now should feel restrained about employing religious
grounds in political judgments. We can think of self-restraint in using
religious grounds as involving a kind of reciprocal concession: "I won't
use my religious grounds to coerce you if you, in turn, will not use your
religious grounds to coerce me." Suppose virtually everyone in a society
now uses religious grounds freely in reaching political conclusions. Telling some people that they should stop would not be fair; they would then
forfeit their own use of religious grounds but be exposed to the widespread use of others. If we ask what can reasonably be expected of people here and now, we have to ask about present practices and expecta-

tions.
Suppose we ask a different question: what would be desirable attitudes
about using religious grounds in the United States if we could develop
them over time? For this inquiry, present practices and expectations are
less central. One might say, "People have long relied on religious
grounds in politics, but our political life would be fairer, and more
healthy if they stopped doing so." Still, I think much depends on what
our culture is like, especially the range of its religious positions and the
attitudes members of different religious groups have toward each other.
Suppose very few people took religion seriously any longer, what may be
the condition in the Netherlands and some Scandinavian countries. It
would hardly make sense to tell people they should discipline themselves
not to rely on religious grounds; since such reliance would have slight
influence in any event. Or, suppose people of different religious views
were nearly all open minded and anxious to grasp insights from other
religious positions. The realm of politics might seem one domain of
fruitful discourse among people with various religious views. On the
other hand, if many religious views were held fairly dogmatically, and
distrust and tension were considerable, removing religion from politics
might seem desirable. Our conclusions about what political life should be
like must be made in light of cultural conditions.
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VI. DISCOURSE AND JUDGMENT

Before I turn to our liberal democracy, I want to make one other
general observation, providing a personal illustration. The observation is
that outsiders and individuals themselves can monitor their discourse
much more easily than they can monitor their bases of judgment. When I
attended college (Swarthmore, a private college), the Student Council
allocated money to student organizations from a central fund. Each· year
the Christian Fellowship received some money, to invite speakers, etc.
One year a majority of members of the Fellowship decided to adopt a
statement of faith; subscribing to the statement was a condition of membership, although nonmembers could attend activities. There was controversy within the fellowship over whether there should be any such statement and over how inclusive it should be. What resulted was a statement
that I thought could be subscribed to by everybody who genuinely considered themselves to be Christians.
Members of the Student Council divided sharply over whether funds
should be given to any organization with an exclusive membership. Those
of us who belonged to the Fellowship favored funding; we urged that that
such an organization might limit membership to people who subscribed to
its principles. Opponents of funding happened to be people who did not
have very positive views about religion, but they did not attack religion.
They argued that funded student organizations should not have exclusive
memberships.
I remember feeling that arguments about the value of religion and
Christianity were really inapt, but I did not have a strong view that I
should try to decide about funding without referring to my own views
about religion, or indeed without reference to my sense of loyalty to
other members of the Fellowship. I suspected that negative views about
religion influenced opponents of funding, and I did not feel I should try
to disregard my own positive feelings.
Telling whether someone else is reasoning publicly in terms of religious grounds is much easier than telling whether they are self-consciously influenced by such grounds. Engaging in a discourse that does not
employ religious grounds is much easier than barring such grounds from
one's considered judgment. These realities lead me to favor greater restraints on discourse than judgment. I shall address shortly the worrisome
argument that such a difference encourages dishonesty and concealment.
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VII. JUDGES

Among public officials, judges are the most constrained in their bases
for decision. Since appellate judges justify their results in formal opinions, we know precisely what grounds they use to defend their decisions.
Generally, they provide reasons based on legally authoritative sources,
like statutes and prior cases. Sometimes however, they must give meaning· to basic concepts like fairness and equality. Then they may engage in
reasoning that is broader in scope. What one does not find, however, is
argument that depends on any source of insight that the judges do not
think is available and forceful for lawyers or members of society in general. One does not find religious grounds. Judges rarely say behavior is
wrong because it violates one particular authoritative religious point of
view. Matters were different in the 19th Century, when the common law
was said to be Christian; but we now find essentially nonreligious arguments for why actions or laws are acceptable or unacceptable.
Judges may employ references to religious morality to indicate traditions in this country, say about abortion or homosexual acts; but judges
do not claim that the morality of Christianity, or any other religion, is
correct because the religion is correct. Opinions claim to rely on bases
for decision that would be authoritative for any judge; no directly religious ground has this status. Present practices preclude judges from advancing directly religious grounds for decision.
What of the actual bases for decision. The ideal of judging is that
judges rely on the arguments that they present in opinions, more or less.
I say more or less, because most opinions are not fully candid in at least
three respects. Typically opinions make cases seem easier than they are.
First, they rely heavily on traditional legal sources even when those
sources are indecisive. Second, they overstate the force of arguments in
favor of the result the judges reach. That is, the opinions make their own
side seem stronger than the judges really think it is, and they make the
opposing side seem weaker than the judges really think it is. Finally,
opinions for an entire court, or for more than one judge, submerge and
conceal differences of view among judges joining the opinion. So, opinions are not fully candid. But, still the arguments they state are usually
the arguments that persuade the judges.
On very rare occasions, judges may find all the legal and other arguments of general force to be indecisive. They may find they need to rely
on some more personal source of insight to tip the balance. Is this ever
appropriate? If it is appropriate, may a judge rely on a religious position
as the more personal source of insight? The first point is arguable. Perhaps judges should always strain to be guided by public reasons, reasons
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that they recognize have force for all judges and that they would feel
comfortable putting into an opinion. I think they should strive hard to be
guided by public reasons, but that when they find these reasons to be
evenly balanced, they may give some weight to more personal reasons
they would not put in an opinion. An example would be, "I can't explain
why, but I feel deeply that a seventh month old fetus counts just as much
as a new born baby." In those rare instances when judges rely on personal reasons they would not put in opinions, I believe they may treat their
own religious beliefs as they would other personal sources of judgment.
To sum up, the public discourse of judges in legal opinions should not
include religious reasons, or "personal" nonreligious reasons. This is the
present practice. Judges should very rarely allow themselves to give
weight to unstated personal reasons or religious reasons.
VIII. LEGISLATORS

Other public officials present more serious issues. I will concentrate on
legislators. Some documents containing legislative justifications are formal in the way that judicial opinions are formal. Of course, legislators
often self-consciously change the law, so legislation does not need to be
tied to existing law in the manner that judicial decisions are tied to existing law. Straightforward arguments that the law is unjust or ineffective
and needs to be changed are fully appropriate. Still, in things like preambles to statutes and committee reports, we find justifications and arguments that are claimed to have general power; in that respect, those resemble judicial opinions.
The troublesome questions concern arguments offered by individual
legislators inside and outside the legislatures, and their actual bases for
judgment. Should a legislator proposing a bill to restrict factory farming
say on the legislative floor: "The Bible calls on us to give greater consideration to animals than we have done so far. If we are to be faithful to
God's will, we should enact this legislation." Should a legislator explain
his or her position in that manner to constituents? Should legislators make
up their own minds on such grounds, even if they do not reveal them
publicly?
At least at a national level, I believe we have reached a general understanding that legislators should not make such religious arguments. They
represent all their constituents, members of diverse religions. They
should not present as crucial arguments grounds that are applicable only
to members of certain religions. This practice is not as securely established or uniformly followed as the practice regarding opinion writing;
but such overtly religious arguments about particular laws and policies
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are not frequently offered by members of Congress ..
I think this practice respects the religious diversity of our population.
Since religious tensions remain significant in the United States, this practice also reduces political and religious conflict in a desirable way. This
restraint involves only a mionor impairment of the religious liberty of
legislators. They have chosen a public role and they often say less than
everything that they think about particular issues. Moreover, the number
of legislators in the country is small in comparison with the number of
citizens. If legislators forego public religious arguments about political
issues, that entails only a slight diminution of people's freedom to act
upon religious understandings.
How legislators should make up their minds is troubling. Unlike judges, they may often find that public reasons are indecisive. Legislators
should focus primarily on public reasons, but we should not expect them
systematically to disregard personal reasons and religious grounds.
As my Student Council example illustrated, purging one's discourse is
much simpler than purging one's judgment; and it is much simpler to tell
whether others are restraining their discourse than whether they are restraining their judgment. The primary restraint on legislators should be
conceived as a restraint on public discourse, not on judgment.
Does this proposal endorse dishonesty and concealment? No one expects legislators to reveal all their grounds for decision. If this is not
expected, their failure to develop religious arguments that carry considerable weight with them is not really dishonest. The issue of concealment is
more difficult. Some people believe that citizens should know as completely as possible the bases on which legislators decide. Such knowledge
can help the citizens decide what to do at the next election. This is a
telling point, but not telling enough to justify wide political speech cast in
religious terms. I do believe legislators appropriately mention that religious grounds matter to them, and certainly they should not lie about
that. What they should not do is to make full religious arguments in the
public political forum.
I have talked about legislators using their own religious convictions.
There is another question. Should they follow constituent opinion that is
based on religious convictions? Suppose most constituents have religious
reasons for thinking fetal research is wrong. Should that affect a
legislator's vote? The answer depends on how ordinary citizens should
make up their own minds and discuss issues. I will discuss that subject in
a moment.
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THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH

Many functions of chief executives and other administrators are legislative. In these functions executives should be guided by essentially the
same principles as legislators in using religious grounds. In some other
functions, executives are more like courts, interpreting and enforcing
existing law; in these functions the guiding principles should be similar to
those for judges.

X. CITIZENS
Ordinary citizens are not trained to restrain their judgments and discourse in the manner of judges or legislators. For many of them, religious convictions have implications for political issues, and acting to
realize these implications is an aspect of the exercise of their religion.
Many of those who believe that God ensouls the embryo at the time of
conception feel that working for restrictive laws on abortion is an aspect
of carrying out God's will. Most citizens play little direct role in political
processes beyond voting, and many do not even vote. Votes for candidates merge impressions about many issues. Asking citizens to distill the
judgments they would have if they put their religious convictions aside on
each of these issues is asking a great deal, and it is unrealistic to think
that most citizens could be very successful. Certainly most citizens would
be skeptical that others would be successful, and the most conscientious
among them in sticking to public reasons would suspect that they were
unfairly forego~ng grounds of judgment others were using. People should
be encouraged to give a priority to public reasons, but they should feel
free to be influenced by religious grounds.
What of discourse by ordinary citizens? Most of their discourse takes
place with family, friends, co-workers, and members of groups to which
they belong. What any one person says has very little effect on political
life as a whole. Asking citizens to censor themselves in their private
conversations would work a serious inhibition, with limited positive
effect. The issue is closer when citizens write to members of Congress or
to newspapers. Perhaps then they should aim for nonreligious discourse.
Most letters are not read with any care; politicians are interested in the
bottom line. The arguments made in newspapers have greater significance. It is desirable for most such letters to be cast in terms of public
reasons, but this forum is also an occasion for the expression of diverse
points of view. This forum is not significant enough to justify a principle
of self-restraint that citizens should restrict themselves to public reasons.
In a discussion on another occasion, Richard Saphire raised the prob_.
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lem of speakers at public school board meetings, and similar community
meetings, who forcefully make religious arguments. Based on conversations with some of these people, Professor Saphire believes they would
find it virtually impossible to formulate their views in any nonreligious
form, but he also believes the effect of such discourse is divisive. These
meetings raise a more serious problem than letters to legislators or newspapers. I am inclined to the view that even in such situations, citizens
should feel free to express what matters most to them, but I do not hold
this view with confidence. 7
In sum ordinary citizens should feel much freer to rely on religious
grounds than are public officials. Since legislators should be able to rely
on views that are properly formed, legislators may give weight to constituents views that rest partly on religious bases.
What about what I call quasi-public citizens, citizens who play a largely public role but are not in the government? Presidents of major nonreligious organizations are important public figures, and they represent
diverse constituencies. They should be guided by principles similar to
those for legislators, and that is how they generally perform their roles.
This is how major columnists should mainly regard their responsibilities
when they comment on pressing political issues, but the argument that
they should feel free to express their unique personal perspectives is
stronger than it is for the heads of major nonreligious organizations.

XI.

RELIGIOUS LEADERS AND 0RGANIZATIONS

Finally, I want to discuss the place of religious organizations, local
churches and synagogues, etc. and their ministers and rabbis, and larger
institutions. I shall briefly pose and answer six questions. Those are:
(1) When addressing their own members, should clergy and churches
limit themselves to general moral ideas or should they draw specific
political conclusions? (2) Should their recommendations extend to supporting or opposing particular parties or candidates? (3) Should clergy,
while strongly identified as clergy, run for public office? (4) Should
clergy and churches engage in ordinary political activities, such as educational campaigns, lobbying, demonstrations, and other attempts to put
strong electoral pressure on officials? (5) In communications to nonmem-

7. That is, I also find appealing the competing view that citizens should be encouraged to
present "public reasons" at such public meetings, and that that encouragement could be fonnulated as an expectation of how citizens would best comport themselves. Of course, no such
fonnulation is likely to have much effect on how people who believe they are called upon by
God to speak in religious tenns will express themselves.
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hers, should they draw highly specific policy conclusions, or limit themselves to more general recommendations? (6) If they should act in the
public arena, should they make specifically religious arguments, or nonreligious arguments, or both?
Each of these questions can be faced from within a religious tradition
or from the standpoint of independent political theory that does not rely
on theological premises. I am adopting the second, nonreligious, perspective here. 8
Before I tackle the questions, I want to clear up one fairly common
misperception. When Jerry Falwell criticized Supreme Court nominee
Sandra Day O'Connor, Senator Barry Goldwater accused his organization, The Moral Majority, of "undermining the basic American principles
of separation of church and state by using the muscle of religion towards
political ends," Goldwater said:
I'm frankly sick and tired of the political preachers across the country
telling me as a citizen that if I want to be a moral person, I must believe in
"A," "B," "C," and "D." Just who do they think they are and from where
do they presume to claim the right to dictate their moral beliefs to me? The
great decisions of Government cannot be dictated by the concerns of religious factions .... We have succeeded for 205 years in keeping the affairs
of the state separate from the uncompromising idealism of religious
groups, and we mustn't stop now! 9

Senator Goldwater's last sentence rings with a version of the American
history of religion and politics that we often hear. That version is about
as inaccurate as history can be. Churches have been involved in politics
throughout this nation's history. It is with this understanding that I approach the six questions.
One, when addressing their own members, should clergy and churches
and synagogues limit themselves to general moral ideas or should they
draw specific political conclusions? Preaching about morality is undoubtedly appropriate, even if that morality has political implications. Thus, no
one could object that ministers stray from their domain if they preach that
consenting sexual acts between adult homosexuals are or are not sinful,
or that rich people have a duty to aid poor people. Controversy begins
when preaching goes beyond morality to cover specific political conclu-

8. I might add that the entire subject of this talk might be approached in either of these
two ways, and that I am adopting throughout the standpoint of independent political theory.
9. Dean Kelley, 1he Rationale for the Involvement of Religion in the Body Politic in THE
ROLE OF RELIGION IN THE MAKING OF PUBLIC POLICY 156-60 (James. E. Wood, Jr. & Derek
Davis eds., 1991).
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sions. There is a difference between telling people that an active homosexual life is sinful and telling them that they should support criminal
sanctions for that behavior. Some have suggested that ministers and
churches should limit themselves to moral pronouncements. Much rests
on just how and when political conclusions are drawn. If a minister offers
conclusions as her own working out of relevant moral principles, but
does not suggest that all others of good faith must agree with her, she
recognizes the freedom of her members and the limits of any special
competence she has. The ease of conclusions and their moral importance
also matter. Sometimes political conclusions will flow in a straightforward way from moral judgments. For example, if the minister preaches
that an active homosexual life is perfectly acceptable to God and not
inferior to a heterosexual life, the conclusion that any criminal sanctions
should be repealed follows closely. If a political decision has great moral
significance, preaching directly about it is especially appropriate. Desegregation and decisions about war or peace have this significance; so does
abortion for many on both sides of the issue. No principle of liberal
politics precludes clergy drawing out specific policy conclusions in their
communications to members.
Two, should the recommendations of clergy and churches to their
members extend to supporting or opposing particular parties or candidates? Favoring particular laws and policies is a step beyond advocating
moral positions; supporting or opposing candidates and parties is a further involvement in politics. Most Americans probably now feel uncomfortable when religious leaders take this further step; they feel uncomfortable with the suggestion that, overall, one candidate or party is more on
God's side than another. These feelings of discomfort are well grounded.
But some political issues are of such overriding significance that churches
are warranted in opposing candidates who take positions they strongly
believe are wrong. Suppose, for example, a white candidate explicitly
takes the position that racial segregation should be reinstituted. In our
present understanding that position seems so blatantly immoral, so contrary to the values of almost all religions, preaching opposition to his
election is proper.
Three, should clergy, strongly identified as clergy, run for office? In
this country, clergy are not bound to the role of clergy for life. But
suppose a minister retains a parish, continues preaching on a regular
basis, and runs for important office. When practicing clergy are legislators or high executive officials, the mixing in personnel of politics and
religion is too great. People should choose between being fully active
ministers and being public officials or political candidates.
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Four, should clergy and churches try to reach a larger public by edu~
cational efforts, by lobbying, and by participating in direct action such as
demonstrations? Many other religious groups now engage in these activities; but over time would it be desirable for these activities to cease or
diminish?
We need to narrow this question. Some pieces of legislation directly
affect churches or religious practices. As affected institutions, churches
should certainly be involved over legislative questions concerning aid to
church schools or property tax exemptions for religious property. They
should also speak out when matters, such as school prayer, concern
religious practices and their appropriate settings.
The harder question concerns broader issues of morals or social justice. Here, the question is whether churches and clergy should move
beyond recommendations to members and participate in the political
process as one might expect General Motors, or the American Medical
Association, to do? There are two powerful arguments for such involvement. One is that churches should not be regarded as different from other
non-governmental organizations, and the legislative process is now replete with lobbying by such groups. The other argument is that churches,
and larger organizations in which they are dominantly involved, often
think seriously about public welfare and conscience; they are a healthy
corrective to self-interested pleadings. On the negative side are concerns
that religious involvement makes political life harsher and more divisive,
and that churches may appear to control the legislative process. The
results may include resentment against particular churches or against the
arrogance of organized religion.
The worry about "control" is met fairly easily on the national level.
There is such diversity of religious views, and such disagreement about
political implications, that neither control, nor its appearance, is very
likely for most issues. Control may be a pervasive concern within a few
states.
The effect of religious involvement in political life is much more
complicated. For some issues, like abortion, debate is more strident
because religious groups have staked out powerful positions. On many
other issues, religious involvement does not have that consequence. Judgments may differ, but mine is that in most cases the ordinary political activities of religious leaders and organizations are an aspect of political
good health rather than ill health.
Five, should churches limit themselves to general recommendations or
draw highly specific policy conclusions? Effective lobbying usually involves support for or opposition to specific proposals, and may involve
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formulating proposals. Just as they may appropriately recommend specific conclusions to members, churches may support those conclusions in a
public arena.
I have already suggested that churches should strongly hesitate to
endorse particular candidates or parties to their own members. The mixing of religion and government is much worse if this endorsement is
made to a general public and the entire citizenry is urged by church
leaders to vote for particular parties and candidates. That has happened
between some prominent conservative Christian clergy and the Republican Party. There is a disturbing quality when one party or candidate is
embraced as being more. in tune with the religiously correct view. The
special "debt" a candidate or party may have to those who directly
helped put them in office and whose support may also be necessary at the
next election is also worrisome.
Sixth, if churches and clergy should involve themselves in political
issues, should they make specifically religious arguments, or nonreligious
arguments, or both? Perhaps religous leaders should try to develop and
present reasons that will have force outside their own particular membersh.ip; but it seems evident that they need not limit themselves to nonreligious arguments. They have special competence to present a religious
. understanding, and an aspect of what they present should be understanding should be that understanding.

XII. CONCLUSION
Let me review the major points I have made. There is a deeply serious
question what role religious convictions should play in political judgment
and discourse. The question is not primarily a legal one, but it is related
to the constitutional values of free exercise and nonestablishment. Full
free exercise points toward use of religious convictions along with other
bases for judgment; full nonestablishment points towards restraint.
. When use of religious convictions involves religious imposition, it is
not appropriate. Even when no imposition is involved, public officials
should be hesitant to rely on their religious convictions. Private individuals should feel much freer to do so. Restraint in discourse should be
greater for legislators, and some other officials, than restraint in judgment. Religious organizations properly play an active role in politics and
they make relevant religious arguments, but they should rarely endorse
candidates and parties.

